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Abstract: Recent research argues that model uncertainty leads the
central bank to adjust interest rates stronger to exogenous distur-
bances than under certainty. This paper investigates whether the
introduction of a cost channel of monetary transmission, whose pres-
ence is empirically supported, changes the impact of model uncer-
tainty on interest rate setting. The basic model is simple enough to
facilitate an analytical closed form solution. We ﬁnd that the pres-
ence of the cost channel dampens the eﬀect of model uncertainty on
interest rate setting and can even oﬀset the activist policy stance.
In this case, the conventional result is reversed and uncertainty in-
duces an attenuated interest rate policy. A richer dynamic model
corroborates these ﬁndings.
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It is now generally acknowledged that central banks face uncertainty about the
true structure of the model that best describes the economy.2 Policymakers aim
at setting interest rates optimally given a particular reference model but, at the
same time, admit that they cannot be completely certain about the true model
speciﬁcation. As a result, central banks want to formulate robust policies that are
to some extent immune with respect to model disturbances. In particular, one
strand of the literature on monetary policymaking under uncertainty proposes
to formulate a policy that performs reasonably well even if the worst possible
misspeciﬁcation realizes. In other words, the policymaker is unable to formulate
a probability distribution over a range of plausible models. Instead, he sets
interest rates so as to minimize the maximum harm to the economy. Such a
policy concept is known as a robust control approach to policymaking and was
pioneered by Hansen and Sargent (2005).
The robust control approach sheds new light on the classical result of Brainard
(1967). In a series of papers, Giannoni (2002, 2005) and Onatski and Stock
(2002), among others, analyze whether the Brainard result carries over to robust
policy in a New Keynesian model of monetary policy. Brainard argued that mul-
tiplicative parameter uncertainty should lead to an attenuated adjustment of the
policy instrument. Blinder (1997, p. 11) refers to this result as the ”Brainard
conservatism principle”.3 Recently, this principle has been challenged as the
2For a survey of optimal monetary policy under various dimensions of uncertainty see Walsh
(2004).
3Blinder (1997, p. 12) further notes that ”I wish more academics would train their high-
powered tools on this question, for I can tell you that, as a Federal Reserve governor, I always
viewed the Brainard conservatism principle as extremely wise.” Wieland (2000) presents one
of the ﬁrst studies of optimal monetary policy under parameter uncertainty using Bayesian
learning. Sack (2000) studies the interest rate setting behavior of the Federal Reserve and
supports the Brainard principle empirically. S¨ oderstr¨ om (2002) ﬁnds that uncertainty about
the persistence properties of inﬂation gives rise to more aggressive policy, while uncertainty
about other parameters might dampen the policy response.
2literature moved to discuss robust policy under general model uncertainty.4 Gi-
annoni (2002, 2005) and Onatski and Stock (2002) show that model uncertainty
does no longer justify a cautious monetary policy response since the policymaker
fears inﬂation to be higher than under certainty and, consequently, adjusts the
policy instrument more aggressively. Leitemo and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2005) recently
provide a tractable framework to analyze robust monetary policy within a sim-
ple New Keynesian macro model. The appealing feature of their contribution is
its tractability that allows the researcher to solve the model analytically. They
show that uncertainty leads to a more vigorous response to supply and demand
shocks.
In this paper, we extend the model of Leitemo and S¨ oderstr¨ om to account for
the cost channel of monetary transmission while preserving the paper’s analytical
tractability. Recent empirical research by Barth and Ramey (2001) and others
draws attention to the cost channel transmission of monetary impulses to the
economy, which describes a supply-side eﬀect of monetary policy that augments
the conventional demand-side channel. To the extend that ﬁrms must pay the
factors of production before they receive revenues from selling their products,
they rely on borrowing from ﬁnancial intermediaries. Monetary policy therefore
impacts on the cost side of the economy. Higher interest rates translate into
higher costs of working capital and induce a rise in inﬂation. Recently, Ravenna
and Walsh (2006) and Chowdhury, Hoﬀmann, and Schabert (2006) integrate a
cost channel in an otherwise standard New-Keynesian model of the business cycle
and show that the presence of a cost channel is tantamount to a direct eﬀect of
interest rates on the inﬂation rate within a forward-looking Phillips curve.
Here we introduce the cost channel of monetary transmission into a standard
New Keynesian model and solve for optimal monetary policy that is robust to
model misspeciﬁcations. We ﬁnd that the introduction of the cost channel has
4The results of Tetlow and von zur M¨ uhlen (2001) show that the eﬀect of uncertainty
on interest rate setting might be less clear-cut than the distinction between multiplicative
parameter uncertainty and general model uncertainty suggests. In fact, ˇ Zakovi´ c, Wieland, and
Rustem (2005) derive a min-max optimal policy under parameter and shock uncertainty that
tends to obey the Brainard principle.
3important consequences for the design of monetary policy under model uncer-
tainty. While model uncertainty, in general, leads the central bank to pursue a
more aggressive policy and adjust interest stronger when facing shocks, the pres-
ence of a cost channel tends to attenuate interest rate setting behavior. We ﬁnd
that these two eﬀects mutually neutralize at very plausible parameter constella-
tions. Hence, at this point uncertainty does not matter for interest rate setting.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that the response to demand shocks becomes attenuated at
realistic realizations of the cost channel. Hence, this paper provides one exam-
ple in which the seminal Brainard result carries over to a min-max approach to
optimal monetary policy in a sticky-price framework.
Central to Hansen and Sargent’s robust control approach is the distinction be-
tween the policymaker’s reference model and the approximating model. The
reference model provides the most likely description of the economy. In the ab-
sence of model misspeciﬁcations, this model generates the conventional rational
expectations solution. Under robust control, however, the policymaker believes
the model to be misspeciﬁed to a certain degree. He formulates a policy rule
which is robust to these model distortions and shields the economy from the
worst possible misspeciﬁcation. This paper introduces a cost channel into the
reference model and derives a robust optimal policy. The approximating model
characterizes the behavior of inﬂation and output if the policymaker follows the
robust policy rule but the reference model turns out to be undistorted. We assess
how the presence of a cost channel aﬀects interest rate setting behavior under
the robust optimal policy and evaluate the impact of uncertainty on the resulting
inﬂation and output dynamics.
This paper is organized as follows. Section two characterizes the simple model
economy while section three derives optimal monetary policy which is robust to
model uncertainty. Section four calibrates the model and analyses the eﬀect of
model uncertainty on interest rate setting behavior. In section ﬁve, several sim-
plifying restrictions are relaxed. It is shown that the basic results are supported
by a richer dynamic model. Section six ﬁnally concludes.
42 Optimal monetary policy with a cost channel
of monetary transmission
Monetary policy shocks are usually thought of as aﬀecting the economy through
their eﬀect on aggregate demand. In a widely cited study, Barth and Ramey
(2001) provide aggregate and industry-level evidence for the conjecture that mon-
etary policy impulses also have important supply-side eﬀects that accompany the
impact on the demand-side of the economy. This cost channel can be motivated
as follows. Assume that ﬁrms have to pay their factors of production before they
receive revenues from selling their products and need to borrow working capital
from ﬁnancial intermediaries. Thus, a rise in the short-term interest rate directly
translates into higher costs of working capital. A monetary contraction aﬀects
the cost side of the economy and leads to a decline in output through an adverse
supply-side eﬀect.5
We adopt a standard forward-looking monetary model and draw on recent work
of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Ravenna and Walsh (2006), and
others who introduce the cost of working capital into a general equilibrium
model.6 The forward-looking Phillips curve (1) and the IS curve (2) represent
log-linearised equilibrium conditions of a simple sticky-price general equilibrium
model
πt = βEtπt+1 + κ((σ + η)xt + ψit) + et (1)
xt = Etxt+1 − σ
−1 (it − Etπt+1) + ut (2)
where πt is the inﬂation rate, xt the output gap, it the risk-free nominal interest
rate controlled by the central bank, and Et is the expectations operator. All
5Recent empirical evidence stronly supports the existence of a cost channel, see Ravenna
and Walsh (2006) and Chowdhury, Hoﬀmann, and Schabert (2006). These papers use a GMM
approach to estimate reduced-form New Keynesian Phillips curves, in which the measure of
real marginal cost is supplemented by the nominal interest rate.
6See, among others, Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003) for a deeper
analysis and the complete derivation of this family of models based on optimizing households
and ﬁrms under monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities.
5variables are expressed in percentage deviations from their respective steady state
values. The discount factor is denoted by β < 1, σ is the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion, η is the elasticity of labor supply, and κ, the slope coeﬃcient of
the Phillips curve, depends negatively on the degree of price stickiness. The
cost-push shock et and the demand shock ut are described by et ∼ N (0,1) and
ut ∼ N (0,1). The coeﬃcient ψ describes the direct impact of interest rates on
inﬂation and, thus, the strength of the cost channel. In the presence of a cost
channel of monetary transmission, changes in interest rates directly propagate
into inﬂation dynamics.
Monetary policy is assumed to set interest rates in order to minimize the welfare
loss due to sticky-prices which is described in terms of inﬂation volatility and

















Minimizing (3) subject to the model in (1) and (2) gives a set of ﬁrst-order
conditions, from which the optimal policy response to shocks can be computed.7
3 Optimal robust policy
The central banker considers the model presented in the previous section as the
reference model, which represents the most likely description of the economic
structure. However, the policymaker knows that this model could be subject
to a wide range of distortions. The task is to reformulate the central bank’s
optimization problem such that the resulting policy rule performs well even if
the model deviates from the reference model. A policy that is optimal in the
reference model but does not take account of possible misspeciﬁcations can turn
out to be disastrous if the misspeciﬁcations realize. Under robust control, in
contrast, the resulting policy rule performs suﬃciently well even if the underlying
economic structure does not coincide with the policymaker’s reference model.
7Giordani and S¨ oderlind (2004) provide an overview of monetary policy applications and
oﬀer a set of solution algorithms.
6We transform the minimization problem into a min-max problem. The central
bank wants to minimize the maximum welfare loss due to model misspeciﬁcations
by specifying an appropriate policy. To illustrate the problem, we introduce a
ﬁctitious second rational agent, the malevolent or evil agent, whose only goal is
to maximize the central bank’s loss. The evil agent chooses a model from the
available set of alternative models and the central bank chooses its policy opti-
mally. Hence, the equilibrium is the outcome of a two-person game. Note that
the evil agent is a convenient metaphor for the planner’s cautionary behavior.
Therefore, the evil agent shares the same reference model that the central bank
entertains and optimizes the same objective function. The only diﬀerence is that
the evil agent wants to maximize rather than minimize the resulting loss.
The set of potential misspeciﬁcations, the control vector of the evil agent, takes
the form of error terms. However, these shocks are not mere additional exogenous
random innovations. Let vt = [vπ
t ,vx
t ]
￿ denote the evil agent’s (2 × 1) control


















Hence, the parameter ω measures the amount of misspeciﬁcation the evil agent
has available. The model thus becomes
πt = βEtπt+1 + κ(σ + η)xt + κψit + [et + v
π
t ] (5)
xt = Etxt+1 − σ




















Note that the control variables vt of the evil agent are masked by the shock
processes et and ut. The standard rational expectations solution for optimal
monetary policy corresponds to ω = 0, such that the evil agent’s budget is
empty.
7The equilibrium dynamics of the model are found by combining this solution with
the reference model. If the full amount of possible misspeciﬁcations realizes, we
refer to the resulting model as the worst case model. If, on the other hand, the
reference model turns out to be undistorted, we refer to the resulting model as
the approximating model. A central bank concerned with robustness designs
policy based on the fully distorted model. Once policy is formulated, however,
the central bank acts as if there were no longer any model uncertainty.
3.1 The policy problem
























xt − Etxt+1 + σ






t denote the Lagrange multipliers associated to the inﬂation
adjustment equation and the consumption Euler equation, respectively. The
Lagrange parameter θ is inversely related to ω. Hence, the rational expectations
case corresponds to θ → ∞.8 In the following, we will loosely refer to θ as the
degree of robustness or the degree of uncertainty, respectively. A lower θ means
that the central bank designs a policy which is appropriate for a wider set of
possible misspeciﬁcations. Therefore, a lower θ is equivalent to a higher degree
of robustness.9 The central bank plays a Nash game against the evil agent,
who wants to maximize the welfare loss. Due to the fact that the ﬁrst order
conditions for a maximum and a minimum are identical, optimization under
8In this case, the evil agent maximizes the welfare loss by choosing vt = 0.
9We follow Leitemo and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2005) and allow, for reasons of tractability, the evil
agent only to respond to the same variables as the policymaker, i.e. the cost shock and the
demand shock. Hansen and Sargent (2005), in contrast, allow the evil agent to respond also
to lagged state variables. The richer dynamic model presented below relaxes this assumption.
8discretion results in the following set of ﬁrst-order conditions
∂L
∂xt




t = 0 (9)
∂L
∂πt
= 0 ⇔ πt − µ
π
t = 0 (10)
∂L
∂it





















t = 0 (13)

















Condition (14) collapses to the standard trade-oﬀ characterizing optimal discre-
tionary monetary policy once we shut-oﬀ the cost channel, i.e. if ψ = 0. Thus, as
Ravenna and Walsh (2006) note, with ψ > 0, optimal policy will result in greater
inﬂation variability for a given level of output gap variability since, due to the
eﬀect of interest rates on inﬂation, stabilizing inﬂation is more costly. In other
words, for a given level of inﬂation volatility, output variability will be lower.
Note that this optimal trade-oﬀ is not aﬀected by uncertainty.
Conditions (15) and (16) describe the evil agent’s choice of model perturbations.
The higher the degree of uncertainty, the larger the distortions vπ
t and vx
t . More-
over, without the cost channel, the distortion in the IS curve equals zero. Hence,
in the presence of the cost channel, uncertainty about output dynamics speciﬁed
in the IS curve matters for optimal policy. Without the cost channel, on the
other hand, optimal policy is not aﬀected by uncertainty about the demand side.
We state a ﬁrst ﬁnding:
Result 1: The more important the cost channel becomes, the larger
the perceived amount of misspeciﬁcation in the IS curve the central
9bank rationally fears. Both model perturbations increase with the
variances of the shock processes.
If ψ = 0, the evil agent will not disturb the IS curve and the results are identical
to those obtained by Leitemo and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2005). Since the cost channel
constitutes a direct link between the IS and the Phillips curve, the evil agent can
do more harm if he increases the amount of misspeciﬁcation in the neighborhood
of the reference IS curve.
3.2 The robust interest rate rule
The ﬁrst-order conditions can be used to derive the worst case solution for output,
inﬂation, and the interest rate. Insert the ﬁrst-order conditions in the distorted







κ2 (σ + η)(σ(1 − ψ) + η)
λ
￿
= et + κψit (17)
The distorted IS curve further implies that the interest rate can be written as
it = −σ(xt − v
x


















θ − 1 − σ2κ2ψ
2￿






θ − 1 − σ2κ2ψ
2￿
+ θκ2 (σ(1 − ψ) + η)
2
If uncertainty becomes larger (θ falls), the central bank fears inﬂation in the
worst case to be higher following both types of shocks. Moreover, the eﬀect of




















Hence, if the cost channel becomes larger, ∂∆e/∂θ and ∂∆u/∂θ increase. The











κ(σ(1 − ψ) + η)
λ
[∆eet + ∆uut]
This equation conveys the basic intuition behind the result of this paper. In the
presence of a cost channel, i.e. if ψ > 0,
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿−
κ(σ(1 − ψ) + η)
λ
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ <
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿−
κ(σ + η)
λ
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Hence, worst-case output must contract less to restore optimality if inﬂation
rises. A central bank that fears the worst-case to happen needs to adjust interest
rates to a smaller extend than in the absence of a cost channel. Note that, under
plausible parameters, σ(1 − ψ) + η > 0. Monetary policy always ”leans against
the wind” (Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler, 1999). Suppose the central bank fears
that inﬂation in the worst-case is high after a shock. In the absence of a cost
channel, the policymaker needs to adjust interest rates strongly to ﬁght inﬂation
and depress output in order to meet the optimality condition (14). Hence, the
policymaker’s interest rate response is weaker than in the absence of a cost
channel.
Result 2: The strength of interest rate adjustment is the net eﬀect
of two opposing forces. If uncertainty increases, πworst
t also increases
and, hence, interest rates must rise stronger than under certainty
to combat inﬂation. If the cost channel is present, i.e. if ψ > 0,
worst-case optimal output contracts less after a shock. The central
bank does not need to contract the economy by rising interest rates
aggressively to restore optimality.
11The detailed implications of uncertainty for interest rate setting are derived in
subsequent sections. Particularly, we will specify the conditions under which
the attenuation-eﬀect of the cost channel dominates the activism-eﬀect of uncer-
tainty.
Substitute πworst
t in the it equation (18) to obtain the optimal interest rate rule
in the worst-case scenario
it = σ(Ωeet + Ωuut) (21)
with the coeﬃcients given by
Ωe ≡
λσκψ + θκ(σ(1 − ψ) + η)
λ
￿
θ − 1 − σ2κ2ψ
2￿
+ θκ2 (σ(1 − ψ) + η)
2
Ωu ≡
λ(θ − 1) + θκ2 (σ(1 − ψ) + η)
2 + θσκ2ψ(σ(1 − ψ) + η)
λ
￿
θ − 1 − σ2κ2ψ
2￿
+ θκ2 (σ(1 − ψ) + η)
2
If we set ψ = 0, we are back in the Leitemo and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2005) solution
it =
σκ(σ + η)
λ(1 − 1/θ) + κ2 (σ + η)
2et + σut
where higher uncertainty leads the central bank to respond stronger to supply
shocks but has no impact on the response to demand shocks.
3.3 The approximating model
If the central bank sets interest rates according to (21), monetary policy is
shielded against the worst model perturbations. Note, however, that this worst
case scenario is only a metaphor for the central bank’s uncertainty about its
reference model. If the reference model is in fact undistorted (vπ
t = vx
t = 0) and
the central bank nevertheless pursues its robust optimal policy, the outcome is
referred to as the approximating model.
Insert the worst-case interest rate rule (21) into the undistorted model to obtain








t = [κ(σ + η)(1 − Ωu) + κψσΩu]ut + [1 + σκψΩe − κ(σ + η)Ωe]et (23)




t = (1 − κ(σ + η)Ωe)et =
λ(1 − 1/θ)
λ(1 − 1/θ) + κ2 (σ + η)
2et
The inﬂation rate increases in θ. Hence, a higher aversion to model uncertainty
makes inﬂation less volatile.
4 Caution, activism, or inactiveness?
Under uncertainty, the central bank fears that after a shock inﬂation is higher
due to the presence of the evil agent’s model distortions, see the misspeciﬁed
Phillips curve (5). Optimality requires, see the trade-oﬀ (14), that output must
fall to restore equilibrium. Hence, the central bank raises the interest rate to
contract the economy. This interest rate adjustment is stronger than under
certainty because the central bank takes the inﬂationary impact of the evil agent’s
distortions into account.
What does the existence of a cost channel of monetary transmission imply for
optimal monetary policy under uncertainty? It has long been argued that uncer-
tainty should lead to a smaller adjustment of policy rates to exogenous shocks
than under certainty. Recently, this line of reasoning came under attack as the
literature moved from assessing multiplicative uncertainty to general model un-
certainty. Within the robust control approach, for example, higher uncertainty
implies that the central bank fears that inﬂation is higher in the worst case
scenario and, therefore, leads the central bank to adjust interest rate more vig-
orously than under certainty. The following sections investigate the role of the
cost channel for the eﬀect of uncertainty on interest rate setting.
134.1 Parameterization
The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy for various values of the cost channel
coeﬃcient. All parameters values are presented in table (1). The discount factor
β is set to 0.99, which is standard in the literature. Ravenna and Walsh’s (2006)
estimates imply a value of κ = 0.10.
Table 1: Parameter values for the analytical model
model policy
β κ σ η λ θ
0.99 0.10 1.8 1 0.25 [40, 1]
The real interest rate-sensitivity of aggregate demand, σ−1, is crucial in this
context. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), for example, ﬁnd σ = 1.86 in a post-
1982 sample for the US economy. Recently, Levin et al. (2005) use Bayesian
techniques to estimate a sticky-price model with various sources of uncertainty
which, in an extension of the basic speciﬁcation, also features a working capital
channel of monetary transmission. They obtain an estimate of σ = 2.04 for the
US economy. In this paper we use σ = 1.8 as the baseline speciﬁcation.
With λ = 0.25, we employ a both plausible and widely used value for the output
weight in the central bank’s objective function. Our measure of model uncer-
tainty, θ, is varied between 40 and 1.
4.2 Uncertainty and interest rate setting
How does the degree of uncertainty aﬀect the strength of interest rate adjust-
ment? As discussed earlier, the cost channel, in general, dampens interest rate
movements. We will now analyze under which conditions the presence of a cost
channel of monetary transmission aﬀects the debate about attenuation versus
anti-attenuation of policy. The interest rate response to cost-push shocks reacts










− λσψ − σκ
2ψ(σ(1 − ψ) + η)
￿
Π (24)
14and the interest rate response to demand shocks is aﬀected by the degree of
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θ − 1 − σ2κ2ψ
2￿
+ θκ2 (σ(1 − ψ) + η)
2￿−2
> 0. We restrict the
analysis to positive values of ψ. It follows that ∂Ωe/∂θ = 0 and ∂Ωu/∂θ = 0 have
one common solution ¯ ψ, while ψ = 0 additionally solves ∂Ωu/∂θ = 0. Figure (1)
plots the derivatives ∂Ωe/∂θ and ∂Ωu/∂θ for plausible realizations of the cost
channel coeﬃcient.
Consider ﬁrst the response to cost-push shocks and its sensitivity to the degree of
model uncertainty. Below the threshold ¯ ψ, ∂Ωe/∂θ < 0. Hence, interest rates are
raised stronger if uncertainty increases. Beyond the threshold, the adjustment
is dampened if uncertainty increases, ∂Ωe/∂θ > 0. Note, however, that in this
range the interest rate is lowered to combat an inﬂationary cost-push shock.
Hence, a positive derivative with respect to θ means that larger uncertainty (θ
falls) leads interest rates to be reduced more strongly. Figure (2) visualizes that,
in general, higher uncertainty leads to more pronounced interest rate response
to supply shocks.
Result 3: The interest rate response to a supply shock becomes
more aggressive if uncertainty increases. If the cost channel is less
important, the interest rate rises stronger if the central bank becomes
more uncertain. If the cost channel is very important for inﬂation
dynamics, larger model uncertainty leads to a stronger interest rate
reduction than under certainty.
Hence, only the sign of the response switches, the policy reaction becomes more
aggressive in either case. As becomes apparent in subsequent sections, the neg-
ative interest rate response to inﬂationary shocks is due to the simplistic model
structure and disappears in the dynamic model to be presented below.
15The reaction to the ut shock is aﬀected in the following way. A central bank
which pursues a robust policy rule adjusts interest rates less aggressively to a
demand shock if the cost channel exceeds the threshold ¯ ψ. Hence, in this range
the seminal Brainard principle holds.
The intuition behind this ﬁnding is the following. Under model uncertainty
the central bank fears inﬂation to be higher following a demand shock than
under certainty about the underlying model structure. Hence, the policymaker
wants to adjust the interest rate stronger. With a cost channel present, however,
strong interest rate adjustments are penalized in terms of additional inﬂationary
pressure. It was already shown that worst-case optimal output improves after a
shock. Hence, the central bank does not need to contract the economy by rising
interest rates aggressively to restore optimality.
Result 4: The interest rate response to a demand shock is hump-
shaped in the cost channel coeﬃcient. An empirically plausible cost
channel coeﬃcient implies that a more robust policy leads to a weaker
interest rate response and secures that the legendary Brainard result
carries over to this context.
Figure (3) displays the interest rate response to a positive demand shock. If the
cost channel is absent, i.e. if ψ = 0, the response equals σ as in the model of
Leitemo and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2005). In this case, uncertainty plays no role for the
stance of monetary policy facing a demand shock. Policy neutralizes the eﬀect
of demand shocks and adjusts interest rates by σ such that the net eﬀect on the
IS curve is zero.
Note that a ψ coeﬃcient slightly below two suﬃces to corroborate the Brainard
result for the reaction to demand shocks. In this case ∂Ωu/∂θ > 0, i.e. more
uncertainty reduces the strength of the interest rate response to shocks.
Ravenna and Walsh (2006) estimate an augmented Phillips curve with U.S. data
and obtain an estimate for ψ of 1.276. As such, the estimate lies below the
critical threshold ¯ ψ. These estimates are, however, surrounded by considerable
uncertainty. An interval of two standard errors around their estimate spans a
16range of plausible cost channel coeﬃcients of
ψ￿[0.2770,2.2610]
The threshold ¯ ψ falls within this range. With an alternative set of instruments,
these authors obtain a considerably larger estimate for ψ of 1.915. Therefore,
the ﬁndings in this paper pertain to a realistic scenario facing policymakers.
In addition, the dynamic model analyzed below shows that, if shocks exhibit
a reasonable amount of persistence, the attenuation eﬀect prevails already at
Ravenna and Walsh’s estimate of ψ = 1.276.
4.3 Uncertainty and welfare
Let’s now consider the variances of output, inﬂation, and interest rates. The
interest rate variance is depicted in ﬁgure (4). We see that a higher degree of
robustness increases interest rate variance. We also clearly see, as suggested
before, the range in which uncertainty has no impact on interest rate volatility
because the presence of a cost channel neutralizes the more active policy needed
under robustness.
The variance of inﬂation, see ﬁgure (5), is falling in the degree of uncertainty
and hump-shaped in the importance of the cost channel . Around the threshold
value of ψ, monetary policy does not react and hence an expansionary cost-push
shock feeds into inﬂation without being dampened. Hence, around this region
the variance is unity and corresponds to those of the shock process. As the cost
channel becomes less important, interest rates are used to ﬁght cost-shocks and
the economy is stabilized. As a result, inﬂation volatility increases if ψ lies below
the threshold value. If the cost channel is very important and ψ lies above its
threshold ˆ ψ, the central bank also uses the interest rate to stabilize the economy.
Hence, inﬂation volatility falls. An intermediate impact of interest rate on ﬁrms’
marginal cost leads to a higher inﬂation response than a small or a very large
impact. Why is this the case? The response of the inﬂation rate to a cost shock
becomes smaller if the central bank’s desire for robustness increases. Since the
17central bank adjusts interest rates stronger if uncertainty becomes larger, shocks
are stabilized more and inﬂation volatility decreases.
The variance of the output gap in the approximating model is visualized in ﬁgure
(6) and closely corresponds to the pattern of interest rate volatility. Without the
cost channel, output variance drastically increases if the central bank’s desire
for robustness grows, i.e. if θ falls. With a high but nevertheless plausible cost
channel coeﬃcient, however, the eﬀect of uncertainty on output gap variance is
muted.
5 Robust policy in a dynamic model
The model considered thusfar illustrates the basic principles. It was solved under
some simplifying assumptions. Among them was the restriction that the evil
agent and the policymaker are restricted to respond to the same set of variables,
i.e. the two kind of shocks. In this section we relax this simplifying and non
innocuous assumption and allow the evil agent to respond also to lagged state
variables and introduce persistence into the shock processes.
The processes driving the cost-push shock et and the demand shock ut are now
given by
et = ρeet−1 + Σeε
e
t with 0 ≤ ρe < 1, ε
e
t ∼ i.i.d.(0,1)
ut = ρuut−1 + Σuε
u
t with 0 ≤ ρu < 1, ε
u
t ∼ i.i.d.(0,1)
The reference model can be compactly written in state space form. The complete



























The vector xt = [x￿
1t,x￿
2t]
￿ summarizes both the predetermined and the forward-
looking variables and A, B, and C are appropriately deﬁned matrices. The 2×1
18vector x1t collects the predetermined variables ut and et with x10 given, and x2t
is a 2×1 vector containing the forward-looking variables xt and πt. Finally, the
2 × 1 vector εt contains the white-noise innovations εu
t and εe
t. The constraint





















s.t. xt+1 = Axt + Bit + C(εt+1+vt+1)
The evil agent’s (2 × 1) control vector is allowed to feed back on the history of
the economy’s state variables xt
vt+1 = ft (xt,xt−1,...) (28)
where ft is a sequence of functions. In fact, misspeciﬁcations can distort the
model parameters, the autocorrelation properties of the error terms, and can in-
troduce non-linearities. The model can be solved using Giordani and S¨ oderlind’s
(2004) algorithms.
Table (2) reports the parameters used in the calibration. Apart from the persis-
tence properties of the shock processes, the numbers are identical to those used
in the previous sections. In addition, the cost channel is reﬂected in ψ = 1.276
as estimated by Ravenna and Walsh (2006).
Table 2: Parameter values for the model simulation
model shocks policy
β κ σ η ψ Σe = Σu ρe = ρu λ θ
0.99 0.10 1.8 1 1.276 1.00 0.40 0.25 15.2
Figure (8) shows the impulse response functions for the interest rate after a
cost-push shock and a demand shock. Model uncertainty induces a substantially
more aggressive interest rate response than under the rational expectations case.
However, without a cost channel the impact of uncertainty aversion and, hence,
the diﬀerence between the robust interest rate rule and the rational expectations
case is much more pronounced than under the scenario with the cost channel.
19This parameter θ is bounded only by 0 with rational expectations corresponding
to θ → ∞. Hence, we have no reasonable a priori range over which we should
perfom the simulation. To overcome the problem of specifying a range for θ, we
follow Hansen and Sargent (2005, chapter 8) and employ what they refer to as
a detection error probability approach. Zero robustness, i.e. the rational expec-
tations case, corresponds to a detection error probability of 0.5. We calculate
this probability and invert it to obtain a context-speciﬁc value of θ. It turns out
that specifying θ = 15.2 corresponds to a detection error probability of around
0.20, see ﬁgure (7), and implies only a small departure from rational expecta-
tions. Hence, the policymaker underlying this simulation is not concerned about
absurdly pessimistic scenarios but considers slight deviations from the rational
expectations benchmark.
The impulse responses to a cost-push shock are presented in the ﬁrst two rows
of ﬁgure (8). In a situation without a cost channel, the interest rate adjustment
under robust policy is stronger than under rational expectations. If a cost channel
is present, the interest rate adjustment is smaller since interest rate movements
are costly in terms of inﬂationary pressure. In this situation, interest rates react
stronger to a supply shock under certainty than under robust policy. As a result,
inﬂation is stabilized less than in the absence of a cost channel. Most importantly,
this result is obtained under an empirically supported value of the cost channel of
1.276, which lies far below the value that was necessary to obtain the attenuation
result in the analytical model of the ﬁrst part of the paper.
The impulse responses after a demand shock also corroborate the analytical ﬁnd-
ings derived in the previous sections. In the absence of a cost channel, uncertainty
has no eﬀect on the response to a demand shock since the robust response and
the rational expectations response are identical. If there is no cost channel, the
central bank always stabilizes demand shock by adjusting ∂it/∂ut = σ as de-
rived in the analytical model. For this reason, ∂it/∂θ = 0. With a cost channel,
however, the Brainard result is restored. The third row in ﬁgure (8) illustrates
that model uncertainty leads the central bank to adjust its policy instrument less
than under certainty. Moreover, in the presence of a cost channel, the response
20of inﬂation and output is dampened when compared to the rational expectations
case.
Hence, model uncertainty motivates a cautions monetary policy stance. We can
therefore state an additional ﬁnding.
Result 5: A robust policy rule derived from a rich dynamic model
supports the basic ﬁndings. Model uncertainty can induce an atten-
uated policy response to shocks and, hence, can restore the seminal
Brainard result.
Consistently with results derived above, the presence of a cost channel of mone-
tary transmission reduces the impact of model uncertainty on interest rate set-
ting behavior and can even restore the case for cautious monetary policy under
uncertainty as suggested by Brainard (1967).
6 Conclusions
This paper derived robustly optimal monetary policy for an economy, in which
a cost channel provides an additional channel of monetary transmission. Two
forces determine the strength of interest rate adjustment. On the one hand,
model uncertainty generally leads the central bank to adjust its policy instrument
more aggressively than under certainty. On the other hand, the presence of a cost
channel generally dampens interest rate responses to shocks. In this paper, we
analyzed the net eﬀect of these two forces and characterized the resulting interest
rate setting behavior. The model is simple enough to facilitate an analytical
closed form solution. We ﬁnd that under plausible parameter values, the cost
channel can oﬀset the activist policy stance. In this case, uncertainty does not
matter for optimal policy or can even lead to an attenuated policy stance. Under
a high but still plausible realization of the cost channel coeﬃcient, the central
bank’s response to demand shocks is muted as the degree of robustness increases.
Hence, the paper provides a simple example in which the seminal ﬁndings of
Brainard (1967) apply to robust monetary policy under model uncertainty. This
21ﬁndings supports the claim made by Blinder (1998, p. 12): ”My intuition tells
me that [the Brainard principle] is more general -or at least more wise- in the real
world than the mathematics will support. And I certainly hope it is, for I can
tell you that I was never far from my mind when I occupied the Vice Chairman’s
oﬃce at the Federal Reserve”.
In the present framework, monetary policy operates under discretion taking pri-
vate sector expectations as given. An interesting question relates to the gains
from monetary commitment in the presence of model uncertainty. How should
the central banker guide expectations formation of price setters and consumers
if he does not fully trust his reference model? How is optimal stabilization pol-
icy aﬀected if the private sector is uncertain about the underlying model and
forms expectations based on a potentially misspeciﬁed model? Dennis (2006,
2007) elaborates on these questions und ﬁnds that the anti-attenuation result
continues to hold. Hence, the presence of a cost channel could, in principle,
important implications for commitment policy under model uncertainty. Future
research is needed to assess whether the results provided in this paper carry over
to monetary policy under commitment.
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Figure 1: Derivatives of Ωe and Ωu with respect to the degree of model uncer-
tainty θ for plausible realizations of the cost channel coeﬃcient
26Figure 2: Interest rate response to cost-push shock
Figure 3: Interest rate response to demand shock
27Figure 4: Interest rate variance
Figure 5: Inﬂation variance
28Figure 6: Output gap variance





























































































































































Figure 8: Impulse response functions for a cost push shock (et) and a demand
shock (ut) under rational expectations (RE) and for robust policy under the
approximating model (robust)
30